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COMMENTS
COMMENT: THE PROPOSED ARKANSAS UNIFORM
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
Introduction
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act' is designed to
alleviate the plight of "interstate children"-a term descriptive of
children shifted from state to state as the victims of custody battles
which are fought in the courts of more than one state.2 The number
of children shifted from state to state every year in the hope of
obtaining a favorable custody decree is so large that the problem has
become a national scandal.3
The Act would terminate this chaotic state of the law by pre-
scribing a statutory procedure to follow to obtain an initial or modi-
fied child custody decree in an interstate situation. The Act is not
limited to divorce-related child custody disputes. It would also facil-
itate the settlement of disputes arising under other court deter-
mined custody arrangements for children that have been aban-
doned, neglected, 4 mistreated, orphaned, 5 or otherwise brought
within the jurisdiction of the court.
Regardless of the fact situation in which a particular custody
dispute arises, the interstate recognition and enforcement of cus-
tody decrees have never achieved a reasonably desirable level of
acceptability. As a result, displeased parents have grown to rely
upon numerous "self-help" actions, notably child-abduction, to
obtain custody of the child. Thus the child, whose best interest is
the presumed focus of all child custody arrangements, is exposed to
potential emotional damage due to extended custody battles and
frequent movement from state to state.
An effective solution to the problems facing the interstate rec-
1. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.J.A.].
2. Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious
Proceedings, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
3. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy
for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1208 (1969). Professor
Bodenheimer's article is the leading authority in the area of child custody under the proposed
Uniform Act. Bodenheimer served as the official Reporter on the Committee which acted for
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing the
U.C.C.J.A.
4. See, e.g., Boatwright v. Pulaski County Juvenile Court, 250 Ark. 138, 464 S.W.2d
600 (1971).
5. See 29 Ark. L. Rev. 104 (1975).
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ognition and adjustment of child custody awards has been long
overdue. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was devel-
oped to meet this challenge. The Act was recommended for adoption
in each state by the American Bar Association in 1968 after the
proposed legislation was prepared by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. As of March 1978, twenty
states had adopted the Act.' The Arkansas General Assembly, how-
ever, has refused to pass the Act.7
1. Major Factors Preventing the Interstate Enforcement of Child
Custody Awards
Attempts at self-help to avoid or modify child custody decrees
have reached an epidemic level. Displeased parents have little rea-
son to fear criminal or civil sanctions for removing a child from the
custody of one parent to another state in violation of custody decree
orders." Under present conditions, only in the most remote circum-
stances will the child and the offending parent be ordered to return
for the proper resolution of the custody dispute.'
Factors giving rise to this transitory and almost lawless situa-
tion are complex, but depend primarily on two recent major devel-
opments in our society: (a) the constantly changing social character-
istics of our nation and (b) a new, modem definition, which has been
adopted by many courts, of what constitutes the best interest of the
child.
a. Societal Factors
While most of the present legal mechanisms used to enforce
child custody awards are grounded on social customs common to the
6. Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Six of these states adopted the U.C.C.J.A. in
1977. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Law Memo 1
(Spring/Summer 1977). An evaluation of the relative success of the California U.C.C.J.A. is
available in Porter & Walsh, The Evolution of California's Child Custody Law: A Question
of Statutory Interpretation, 7 Sw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1975), and Plight of the Putative Father in
California Child Custody Proceedings: h Problem of Equal Protection, 6 U. Cal. D.L. Rev. 1
(1973).
7. The Act was defeated in the 1977 session of the Arkansas General Assembly. In 1977
the bill (S. 259) passed both the Senate and House Judiciary committees and also the Senate
as a whole. On the last day of the 1977 session, proponents were successful in passing the
bill in the House, but were subsequently defeated upon a request for a roll call vote.
8. See, e.g., Estes v. State, 246 Ark. 1145, 442 S.W.2d 221 (1969) (construing Ark. Stat.




eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, decreasing justification for re-
liance upon those rules can be found in our modern society.'"
In the past various cultural, religious, and legal constraints
served to maintain the total number of divorces at a minimal level.
Few divorces meant even fewer applications for initial and modified
custody decrees. Today, however, the number of marriages ending
in divorce has reached a level that is unprecedented." Divorce has
truly become an established aspect of our American culture.
The total number of children involved in divorce and custody
proceedings has increased as well. In 1968 it was estimated that over
three million children were involved in court-ordered custody ar-
rangements across the nation. 2 This figure, extrapolated to 1978,
has increased to approximately seven million children. 3
Finally, the high mobility of the American public also strains
the desired permanence of child custody awards. 4 Estimates are
that twenty percent of all Americans move every year. 5 Since many
of these moves are across state lines, the opportunity immediately
arises for either parent to seek a more favorable decree against the
other parent.
In light of these trends, it is apparent that courts and legislators
should no longer fail to recognize the validity of custody decrees
issued in other states. These decrees were originally issued to
achieve the best possible custody arrangement for the child's wel-
fare and should not be subsequently changed by a court of any state
without a very strong showing that a change will in fact meet the
child's needs.
b. The "Best Interest of the Child"-A New Definition
All courts in making a child custody award look to the best
interest of the child as the controlling element in a custodial deter-
mination." The term "best interest" is flexible. 7 However, a defini-
10. See generally Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental-Psychological Ap-
proach to Proof and Decisionmaking, 12 Willamette L.J. 491 (1976).
11. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
U.S. 55 (1977).
12. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1207-08.
13. Id.
14. Comment, Conflicting Custody Decrees: In Whose Best Interest?, 7 Duq. L. Rev.
262 (1968-1969).
15. C. Abrams, The Language of Cities: A Glossary of Terms 191-92 (1971): "High
physical mobility is characteristic of Americans, approximately one in five of whom have
changed their place of residence every year since 1948 .. "
16. See Walker v. Walker, 262 Ark. 648, 559 S.W.2d 716 (1978); Townsend v. Lowery,
238 Ark. 338, 382 S.W.2d 1 (1963); Holt v. Holt, 228 Ark. 22, 305 S.W.2d 545 (1957); West v.
[Vol. I
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tional problem occurs in applying the term primarily because of the
conflict between the requirement of easily opened custody decrees
and of the need for stability in the interest of the child's long-term
welfare.
This problem is allegedly caused by the fact that many courts
are still guided by remnants of arbitrary common law rules dictating
"the best interest of the child."' 8 At common law custody by the
natural parent was presumed to be in the best interest of the child:"
the custody of children of "tender years" was ordinarily awarded to
the mother,20 and the father had an almost absolute right to serve
as the natural guardian of his children.2' Most of these rules only
incidentally aided in determining which was the proper parent to
assume the future responsibility of the child. The rules also fostered
the requirement for frequently reopened decrees because the child,
as he grew older, constantly changed from one category of common
law parental custody preference to another.
At the beginning of this century, a few enlightened jurisdictions
began to discover that the common law rules were not actually
serving the best interest of the child.22 These courts began to con-
sider various psychological, social, economic, and cultural data in
deciding custody. 23 Paralleling this increased interest in sociological
data were the efforts of child development experts who began to
focus on factors which should be considered in child custody dis-
putes.2 ' They learned that the stability found in a secure and contin-
uous parent-child relationship was of prime importance.
Griffin, 207 Ark. 367, 180 S.W.2d 839 (1944); Kirby v. Kirby, 189 Ark. 937, 75 S.W.2d 817
(1934); Daily v. Daily, 175 Ark. 161, 298 S.W. 1012 (1927), for the Arkansas Supreme Court's
application of the term "best interest."
17. See Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27, 29 (1881)(chancellor not bound by rigid rules and
should act as "humanity, respect for the parental affection, and regard for the infant's best
interests may prompt"). For factors to be considered in determining the custodial "best
interest" of the child, see Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402, which offers the following
criteria: (1) the wishes of the parents; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the interaction and
relationship of the child with his parents, siblings, and any other person who may signifi-
cantly affect the child's best interest; (4) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school,
and community; and (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
18. Judicial attitudes toward child custody cases have been criticized as "marked by
question begging, rigid rules, and platitudes which unfortunately tend to inhibit careful
inquiry and thorough evaluation." Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 423, 427
(1964).
19. Siebert v. Benson, 243 Ark. 843, 422 S.W.2d 683 (1968).
20. Walker v. Walker, 262 Ark. 648, 559 S.W.2d 716 (1978).
21. See Coulter v. Sypert, 78 Ark. 193, 95 S.W. 457 (1906).
22. For a modern approach to use of various social scientific factors to determine the
child's best interest, see generally Batt, supra note 10, and authorities cited therein.
23. Id. at 492.
24. Id. passim.
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Stability is now recognized by child development experts as the
most important factor influencing the child's future health, growth,
and maturity.2 As a result, some experts have claimed that, in the
absence of emergency situations, custody decrees should remain
immutable for a period of at least one or two years.26 Others have
urged that custody determinations should nearly always be perma-
nent and irrevocable. 2 Stability, then, is recognized as being in
the child's best interest. Accordingly, at the outset the Act incor-
porates into the modern definition of "best interest" the concept
that stability for the child is the highest priority of the custody
determination.
21
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court and the
courts of states that have not adopted the Act have been slow to
accept stability as the most important element in child custody
determinations.29 The'general view is that the courts must have wide
and unhampered flexibility in modifying child custody awards and
that ease in modification outweighs the interest of the child's stabil-
ity.30 Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
a custody decree is essentially of a transitory nature, and that a
court in addressing a custody decree, if it is to perform its function
responsibly, cannot be bound by a prior decree of another court.3'
As a consequence, the situation is presented almost daily where
the court of one state has before it the child of a parent seeking a
custody award or attempting to modify an earlier award granted in
another state. In many instances the court in that state has neither
the necessary evidence nor the appearance of the other parent to aid
its objective determination of the child's best interest. Furthermore,
the court, in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction in interstate
child custody disputes, realizes that if it does not make the award,
25. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1209 (citing R. Levy, Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Legislation: A Preliminary Analysis 237 (1969); A. Watson, Psychiatry for Lawyers 197
(1968)).
26. See, e.g., the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, which recognizes a two-year
waiting period to discourage child custody modifications, discussed in Newbern & Johnson,
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: Analysis for Arkansas, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 175, 185
(1974).
27. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1209.
28. U.C.C.J.A. § 1. Stability has been recognized as an important element, though not
controlling, in Arkansas child custody determinations. Boatwright v. Pulaski County Juvenile
Court, 250 Ark. 138, 464 S.W.2d 600 (1971). See also Schiller, Child Custody: Evaluation of
Current Criteria, 26 DePaul L. Rev. 241 (1977); Comment, Best Interest of Children v.
Constitutional Rights of Parents, 81 Dick. L. Rev. 733 (1977).
29. See generally Children in Transit: Child Custody and the Conflict of Laws, 6 U.
Cal. D.L. Rev. 160 (1973); 35 La. L. Rev. 904 (1975).
30. See authorities cited note 28 supra.
31. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 612 (1958).
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the parent will often seek another forum.32 Yet, far too many times
a custody award is made under these circumstances. As a result, the
final determination of the issue of the child's best interest is left
open to speculation.
It is clear that many judicial policies affecting child custody
determinations and enforcement are insufficient to meet the needs
of children. Obviously, some changes should be made in outmoded
attitudes that do not recognize that stability, rather than uncon-
trolled child custody modifications, is paramount to the child's best
interest. Modifications should become the exception, not the rule,
and should be granted only after a strong showing of significant
"changed circumstances. '33 Provision of an orderly procedure
should be the intent of any legislative change to protect the child
from the possible emotional damage which a custody dispute may
cause.
2. Basic Provisions and Purposes of the Act
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is a simple but
comprehensive scheme by which courts, in an interstate child cus-
tody dispute, are guided in an orderly procedure when considering
a request for child custody.34 The dominant objective of the Act is
to obtain the best and most permanent solution for the benefit of
the child.3 The stability of the child in a continuous parental rela-
tionship is the objective, and this goal ordinarily outweighs all other
considerations.
Generally, the first step in the process of issuing or modifying
a decree is that a court in one of the states involved in the dispute
32. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1211. See also Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solo-
mon's Sword: Current Considerations in Child Custody Cases, 81 Dick. L. Rev. 683 (1977);
Foster & Freed, Children and the Law, 2 Fam. L.Q. 40, 49 (1968).
33. The frequently litigated topic of what exactly constitutes "changed conditions"
sufficient for a court to reopen and modify custody decrees is beyond the scope of this
comment. Basically, the Arkansas Supreme Court has set forth the rule that only if conditions
have changed so as to warrant modification of the decree, or if conditions come to light which
were unknown to the court when the decree was rendered, may there be a modification. See
Park v. Crowley, 221 Ark. 340, 253 S.W.2d 561 (1952); Thompson v. Thompson, 213 Ark. 595,
212 S.W.2d 8 (1948); Nelson v. Nelson, 146 Ark. 362, 225 S.W. 619 (1920). See also 17 Ark.
L. Rev. 223 (1963).
34. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1218.
35. U.C.C.J.A. § 1. See also 73 Yale L.J. 134, 134-35 (1963), which focuses on the major
problems involved in a child custody modification request of a decree from another state:
[Tihe difficult problem of striking an appropriate balance between these interests
is complicated by uncertainty as to finality and modifiability of such decrees in the
granting state, by the introduction of technical issues of jurisdiction and conflict
of laws, and by an overriding concern for the welfare of the child.
19781
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assumes full responsibility for the custody of the child.3 This court
is referred to in the Act as the "custody court." For this purpose the
state court is selected which has access to as much evidence and
information as possible concerning the child and family. Next, other
essential sources of evidence, which are often out of state in the case
of an interstate custody dispute, are channelled into the custody
court. At this point, based upon all of the evidence available, a
decree is issued which other states must abide by and, more impor-
tantly, enforce in their jurisdiction if necessary. Future adjustments
in custody and visitation privileges are generally made only by the
original custody court. However, if the child and family no longer
have appreciable ties with the original court, a new custody court
is selected for purposes of modification and all pertinent informa-
tion is channelled from the prior to the subsequent court.37 The Act
covers such matters as jurisdiction, notice, evidence, and informa-
tion in addressing the specifics of the orderly process it sets out.
a. Jurisdiction
The Act establishes basic jurisdictional rules in an interstate
custody dispute. It requires not only minimum contacts with the
state for jurisdictional purposes, but also maximum contactsY Ju-
risdiction in custody cases is normally limited to courts in the
child's home state or state in which there are other strong contacts
with the child and his family. The Act recognizes that appropriate
standards of jurisdiction are the only practicable means to distin-
guish decrees that deserve recognition by other states from those
that do not.3 9
The Act attempts to eliminate the most common abuse of inter-
state enforcement of child custody awards by providing that the
mere "physical presence" of the child in the state is no longer suffi-
cient grounds for the court to take jurisdiction.40 The basic notion
underlying the Act, that jurisdiction be limited to those states
which have maximum access to all relevant facts, forbids jurisdic-
tion when the child and parent are only physically present with no
durable ties to the state."1 As a result, if the presence of the child in
36. The following summary of the basic scheme of the U.C.C.J.A. is based on Bodenhei-
mer, supra note 3, at 1218.
37. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 3, 14.
38. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1218.
39. 73 Yale L.J. 134, 148-50 (1963). For an evaluation of standards of jurisdiction in
current usage, see Jarrett, Jurisdiction in Interstate Child Custody Disputes, 12 Gonz. L. Rev.
423 (1977).
40. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(b), (c).
41. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1227-28.
[Vol. 1
COMMENTS
the state is only temporary, a court in that state will not have
jurisdiction to determine custody.
Similarly, presence in the state for the purpose of "migratory
divorce" requiring domicile of only short duration will not confer
custody jurisdiction. 2 This policy is based on the fact that jurisdic-
tion to make a child custody award involves considerations different
from those involved in jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage."3 Follow-
ing this view, submission by the other parent to the jurisdiction of
a migratory divorce court does not grant the court sufficient con-
tacts with the state to dispose of the custody issue." Mere technical
personal jurisdiction does not add relevant new evidence, and con-
sent cannot confer a basis for interstate jurisdiction which does not
otherwise exist.45
Closely related to the Act's rejection of the physical presence
of the child in the state as a basis of jurisdiction is the limitation of
the doctrine of emergency jurisdiction." Emergency jurisdiction of
a court over a child within its jurisdiction has often been confused
with the physical presence rule. This jurisdiction is found in the
power of the state, derived from "the protection that is due to the
incompetent or helpless"47 or from the responsibility in an emer-
gency to act as parens patriae," to take measures concerning the
custody of a child found within its borders. This jurisdictional de-
vice is clearly "not intended for the settlement of custody disputes
between parents and others." 9 Accordingly, the Act limits emer-
gency jurisdiction based solely on physical presence to appropriate
cases of abandonment, neglect, or mistreatment.
The Act establishes rules for the ascertainment of which state
court should take jurisdiction over the custody proceeding in an
interstate situation. Rather than domicile, the criterion most com-
monly used in divorce proceedings, the Act grants primary child
custody jurisdiction to the court in the child's "home state."' 1 The
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 42, 53 (1940)).
44. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1228.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1229 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 (Proposed Official
Draft 1967)).
47. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
48. Id. at 434, 148 N.E. at 626.
49. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1230; Rheinstein, Jurisdiction in Matters of Child
Custody, 26 Conn. B.J. 48, 64 (1952).
50. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a)(3).
51. Id. § 3(a)(1). See also Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1224.
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home state is generally the state in which the child has lived for at
least six consecutive months with a parent or person acting as par-
ent immediately before the custody proceedings were instituted.
This definition of home state parallels the sociological view that the
"established home"5 constitutes the last place where the child has
lived with a parent for a sufficient time to become integrated within
the community. Most American children have been found to be
integrated into the community after living there for six months.53
Thus, if the child lived in a state for six months with one parent
who claims custody immediately before the case goes to court, that
state automatically has home state jurisdiction. However, if the
child is abducted by the other parent, home state jurisdiction is
extended by the Act for an additional six months to permit the stay-
at-home parent the opportunity to sue in his own state. 5' This exten-
sion protects the parent with legal custody of the child from the
necessity of following the abducting parent and child to another
state to reclaim the child in court.55 This extension also applies to
the situation where the child is away at school or has run away from
home. 6
The home state jurisdiction provision is supplemented in sec-
tion 3 of the Act with the "significant connection" test. This is
basically an alternative jurisdictional provision.5" For example, if
the family has moved frequently and there is no state in which the
child has lived for six months prior to suit, home state jurisdiction
may not exist. In this situation the significant connection test is
applied to determine the correct state court to take jurisdiction in
that "there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships. . .. "I'
As in the home state test, this rule rejects mere physical pres-
ence of the child in the state as a basis sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion.
b. Simultaneous Jurisdiction and Declining Jurisdiction
It is apparent that in many situations, particularly when the
52. See Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 815 (1964),
for a general discussion of "established home."
53. Id. at 818.
54. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a)(1)(ii).
55. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1225-26.
56. Id. at 1226.
57. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a)(2).
58. Id.
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significant connection test is utilized to grant jurisdiction, more
than one state will have a basis for jurisdiction under the Act.
Which court has priority in exercising jurisdiction under these
circumstances?
Section 6 is entitled "Simultaneous Proceeding in Other
States" and addresses this problem. Simply stated, while jurisdic-
tion may possibly exist in more than one state under the home state
and significant connection provisions, jurisdiction may not be exer-
cised simultaneously in two or more states.5
The Act supplements this rule with two guidelines for deter-
mining priority. First, priority of filing the petition determines
which of the courts that have jurisdiction may proceed with the
case. Subsequent courts will then yield to that court. 0 Various no-
tice provisions of the Act insure that courts will be informed of
pending proceedings involving the same child in other states." Sec-
ondly, the familiar "inconvenient forum" principle permits a court
to decline jurisdiction in certain circumstances.2 The Act has re-
fashioned this principle to accomodate child custody cases and "to
encourage judicial restraint in exercising jurisdiction whenever an-
other state appears to be in a better position to determine custody
of the child. '6 3 This principle implements the Act's strong policy
against competitive and conflicting proceedings in custody cases. 4
In appropriate cases both of the priorities may be combined to
select the correct forum. 5 For example, if a court with priority based
on the first-to-file rule determines that a subsequent court is the
more appropriate forum, it may defer to that court. Once a custody
decree has been rendered, the original court is given preferential
jurisdiction under the modification-of-custody provisions of the Act.
If, however, the original court's jurisdiction has ended, any conflicts
among subsequent courts would again be resolved with the aid of
the first-in-time or the inconvenient forum principles.6"
Another permissible reason for declining jurisdiction within the
context of "simultaneous jurisdiction" is that the petitioner has
acted reprehensibly in taking the child from the other parent. 7 The
court in these circumstances should ordinarily, unless required by
59. U.C.C.J.A. § 6; Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1230.
60. U.C.C.J.A. § 6.
61. Id. §§ 4, 5.
62. Id. § 7.
63. Id. § 7(c)(1)-(5); Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1230.
64. U.C.C.J.A. § 1(a)(1).
65. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1231.
66. Id.; U.C.C.J.A. § 14.
67. U.C.C.J.A. § 8.
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the child's best interest, decline to exercise jurisdiction.68 While this
provision is closely related to the enforcement sections of the Act,
its utilization at this point in the custody dispute as a jurisdictional
device serves the same purpose.
c. Notice, Evidence, and Information
The various provisions of the Act would be meaningless without
a system by which all the interested parties and courts could insure
that a custody decree was issued and enforced based on all of the
important evidence and information available. The Act recognizes
that one court operating in isolation cannot do justice to the child
or contestants within the interstate situation because a large portion
of the relevant evidence may be in other states.69 Therefore, to pro-
mote the exchange of information and other forms of assistance
between the courts of various states in custody cases, a free-flow of
judicial and evidentiary data must be guaranteed. 0
Generally, the Act contains a number of provisions for obtain-
ing and distributing custody dispute facts which would not reach
the court through the normal adversary process." The court itself
takes an active part in obtaining the evidence through the assis-
tance of courts in other states. As a result, the chancellor is able to
look beyond state boundaries to arrive at a fully informed judgment
which considers all contestants, resident and nonresident alike, on
an equal basis and in relation to the welfare of the child."
Besides assuring the best and most complete source of informa-
tion, this system of notice and information is important for another
policy reason-it serves to avoid decrees which are partial to the
local resident because of the one-sided nature of the hearings and
may therefore cause resistance to recognition by other states." Pres-
ently, the petitioner's own story and that of his witnesses are often
all the evidence the chancellor has before him when making the
custody decision."4
The notice provisions of the Act require that before a decree is
68. Id.
69. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1242.
70. U.C.C.J.A. § 1(a)(8).
71. Id. §§ 6, 9, 10, 16-22; Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1243.
72. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1243. In Arkansas it has been recognized "that in no
type of case do the personal observations of the chancellor mean more than they do in a child
custody matter." Perez v. Perez, 256 Ark. 639, 640, 509 S.W.2d 531, 531 (1974). See also
Cousins v. Smith, 254 Ark. 28, 33-34, 491 S.W.2d 587, 591 (1973).




issued or modified, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
shall be given to all of the parties to the custody dispute.75 Notice
under the Act shall be given in a manner "reasonably calculated"
to give notice."0 The details of this provision emulate the familiar
notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate and International Proce-
dure Act" and will reduce the number of claimants seeking to avoid
the res judicata effect of the contested custody decree where one
party claims that he was not properly informed of the proceeding.
Other notice provisions of the Act insure not only that the no-
tice and jurisdictional requisites are met, but also constitute an
innovative evidentiary and informational system as well. The com-
mon theme in these provisions is that the notice provisions are tied
to the evidentiary needs of the custody proceeding. For example,
Section 9 provides that every party in his first pleading shall give
information under oath as to the child's present and past addresses
and the name and present address of the person with whom the
child has lived during the last five years.78 The declarant shall also
state whether he has participated in any other litigation concerning
the custody of the child in any state79 and if he knows of any person
not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the child
or claims to have custody or visitation rights with respect to the
child.8 0 The court in some cases may require joinder of a person
determined to be a party. He will then be notified of the pendency
of the proceeding and of his joinder.'
Additionally the declarant shall give additional information as
required by the court.2 The court may examine the parties about
the details of the information furnished and about other matters
pertinent to determining the court's jurisdiction and disposition of
the case. Each party thereafter has a continuing duty to inform the
court of other custody proceedings concerning the child of which he
75. U.C.C.J.A. § 4.
76. Id. § 5.
77. Ark. Stat. Ann. 88 27-2501 to -2507 (Cum. Supp. 1977). However, read in light of
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), the leading United States constitutional case on
personal notice in child custody cases, the exact scope of the notice requirements necessary
for child custody proceedings may still be unclear. In May one of the parties to the proceeding
successfully remained out of the jurisdiction to avoid service of process and later avoided the
res judicata effect of the decree because of the lack of "notice."
78. U.C.C.J.A. § 9(a).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. U.C.C.J.A. § 10.
82. Id. § 9(b).
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later obtains information.13 No longer will a party be able to avoid
service and the binding effect of a decree 4 since it is very likely that
some party to the proceeding will inform the court of that party's
interest in the custody proceeding.
Another innovative section of the Act authorizes the court to
order any party to the proceeding who is in the state to appear
personally before the court and bring the child if he has physical
custody.8 5 If the party is outside the state, the court can give notice
with a statement indicating that if the party does not appear, with
or without the child as required by the court, failure to appear may
result in a binding decision adverse to the party.8
The policy reason behind this provision is clear. Under the Act
the purpose of personal jurisdiction is to bring all the custody claim-
ants before the court so that the chancellor can make a personal
evaluation and permit them to present their evidence. This aim is
not attained by a mere "requirement" of personal jurisdiction found
in most long-arm statutes, where technical jurisdiction and not per-
sonal jurisdiction is commonly the result.8 The Act assists the
courts in obtaining personal appearance with the aid of a court order
issued in the state of a person's residence. 8 Travel expenses may
also be advanced or reimbursed at the discretion of the court to
permit the appearance of the parties.8 0
In the event travel to the adjudicating state is not practicable,
out-of-state depositions or hearings before a court in another state
may be arranged by the court." In addition, the other state's social
services department may be requested to provide information for
use in the custody proceeding." The Act also permits a person to
give his statement voluntarily in one state for use in a custody
proceeding in another. 3 The opportunity of a custody claimant to
83. Id. § 9(c).
84. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
85. U.C.C.J.A. § 11.
86. Id.
87. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1234 (citing Rheinstein, Jurisdiction in Matters of
Child Custody, 26 Conn. B.J. 48, 57, 63 (1952)).
88. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1234.
89. U.C.C.J.A. § 11.
90. Id. §§ 11, 19-20.
91. Id. § 18.
92. Id. § 20(a). The proposed Act includes as an optional provision the social services
study requirement. For discussions of the practical use of such reports see Gozansky, Court-
Ordered Investigations in Child Custody Cases, 12 Willamette L.J. 511 (1976); Leavell,
Custody Disputes and the Proposed Model Act, 2 Ga. L. Rev. 162, 185-89 (1968); 40 U. Col.
L. Rev. 485 (1968). Compare social study mandates in the Arkansas Revised Uniform Adop-
tion Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 56-201 to -221 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
93. U.C.C.J.A. § 20(b).
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have his or her side of the case considered by the court is thus amply
provided by the Act.
3. A Comparison of the Act's Major Provisions with Arkansas Law
To the Arkansas attorney practicing in the area of domestic
relations the most important provisions of the proposed Act concern
the interstate procedures for custody decree modification and the
deterrence of parental exercise of self-help in an interstate situation.
a. Modification of Child Custody Awards
The Act creates basic rules that must be followed to ascertain
the best interest of the child when there is a request to modify a
custody decree issued by another state. Strict judicial adherence to
the modification rules is essential. The rules for modification affect
the areas of jurisdiction, simultaneous jurisdiction, declining juris-
diction, notice, bond, enforcement, and punitive decrees.
(1) Jurisdiction
In order to restrict in this state the modification of custody
decrees issued in other states, section 14 of the Act would require
that a person seeking modification must address his petition to the
prior custody court unless that court no longer has jurisdiction or
has expressly waived its jurisdictional priority. 4 The fact that the
prior court had previously considered the case and has the case file
among its records is one factor favoring the continued jurisdiction
of that court. 5 However, once all the persons involved have moved
away or the contact with the state has otherwise decreased, modifi-
cation jurisdiction also moves. Under the Act all documents of the
original court are then transmitted to the next court."
Arkansas presently has no counterpart to the Act's jurisdic-
tional requirements for modification. As a practical matter, if the
child and at least one contestant are present in Arkansas for any-
thing resembling a legitimate reason, their mere physical presence
is sufficient to exercise modification jurisdiction. 7 No other single
94. See id. §§ 13-15.
95. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1236 (citing Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the
Interstate Child Custody Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act,
38 S. Cal. L. Rev. 183 (1965); Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev.
795 (1964)). See also Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litiga-
tion: Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. Col. L. Rev. 495 (1975); Comment,
Child Custody Modification and the Family Code, 27 Baylor L. Rev. 725 (1975).
96. U.C.C.J.A. § 14.
97. See, e.g., Bonds v. Lloyd, 259 Ark. 557, 535 S.W.2d 218 (1976) (citing Restatement
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rule so abets the child-abductor searching for a forum to obtain
jurisdictional grounds."
Perhaps even more disturbing is that no clear demarcation in
the cases exists between decisions in which the Arkansas courts
have recognized the jurisdictional priority of another state and those
in which the courts have disregarded it and accepted jurisdiction.
Since the basis of jurisdiction is the threshold issue in child custody
modification under the proposed Act, this area of Arkansas law is
obviously one in direct conflict with the Act. The Act would provide
succinct guidelines for the parties to the proceeding as to whether
an Arkansas court may permissively take jurisdiction over the mat-
ter.
(2) Simultaneous Jurisdiction and Declining Jurisdiction
As early as 1928 the Arkansas Supreme Court dealt with the
problem of simultaneous jurisdiction in child custody modification
cases.9 The only rule to be gleaned from the early cases, however,
is that recognition of simultaneous jurisdiction with courts of other
states is solely within the discretion of the chancellor.' 00 As a practi-
cal matter, a case is rarely overturned in Arkansas for failing to
recognize and defer to another state court's exercise of custody juris-
diction."01
Under the Act, however, it is expressly prohibited for a state
court to exercise jurisdiction if it is found that a proceeding concern-
ing the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state
exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the Act.' 2
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 (1971); Shaw v. Shaw, 251 Ark. 665, 473 S.W.2d 848 (1971)).
In Bonds the court said, 'This court has held custody cases are not viewed as property cases
and do not come within the rule of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution
relating to foreign judgments." Bonds v. Lloyd, 259 Ark. 557, 561, 535 S.W.2d 218, 220 (1976).
See also Cooper v. Cooper, 229 Ark. 770, 318 S.W.2d 587 (1958) (citing May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528 (1953)); Gregory v. Jackson, 212 Ark. 363, 205 S.W.2d 471 (1947); Keneipp v.
Phillips, 210 Ark. 264, 196 S.W.2d 220 (1946).
98. For discussion of the problem of child-abduction, see Foster & Freed, Child Snatch-
ing and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28
Hastings L.J. 1011 (1977); Hudak, The Plight of the Interstate Child in American Courts, 9
Akron L. Rev. 257 (1975); Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child
Custody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. Rev. 521 (1974); Comment, Legalized
Kidnapping of Children by Their Parents, 80 Dick. L. Rev. 305 (1975); Comment, Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: An Attempt to Stop Child Rustling, 12 Willamette L.J. 623
(1976); 55 N.C.L. Rev. 1275 (1977).
99. Hamilton v. Anderson, 176 Ark. 76, 2 S.W.2d 673 (1928). See also Bonds v. Lloyd,
259 Ark. 557, 535 S.W.2d 218 (1976); Shaw v. Shaw, 251 Ark. 665, 473 S.W.2d 848 (1971).
100. See cases cited note 99 supra.
101. See cases cited note 99 supra. But see Edrington v. Fitzgerald, 257 Ark. 61, 514
S.W.2d 712 (1974).
102. U.C.C.J.A. § 6.
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Thus, a proceeding in Arkansas would be stayed under the Act
pending the other state's decision to exercise its home state or signif-
icant connection jurisdiction.'"3 The converse would be true when
the court of another state has before it contestants under a pre-
viously issued Arkansas decree.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has previously approved author-
ity in basic compliance with the Act in matters of declining jurisdic-
tion. In Shaw v. Shaw' 4 the Arkansas court cited with approval the
language of Justice Traynor in Sampsell v. Superior Court'5 where
it was found that courts of more than one state may have jurisdic-
tion over a child "domiciled" in one state, but that the actual exer-
cise of jurisdiction should be deferred to that court with a more
substantial interest in the child. 06 The Arkansas Supreme Court in
Shaw, however, only adopted the first part of the Sampsell rule.
Shaw therefore stands for the proposition that it is presumed to be
in the child's best interest for a court of this state to exercise its
discretion and modify out-of-state custody decrees regardless of
simultaneous jurisdiction of another state court.
Adoption of the Act, however, would establish statutorily a
rebuttable presumption that the best interest of the child has been
provided for when the chancellor declines jurisdiction and defers to
a court with prior jurisdiction over the child.'0 This provision would
restrict the chancellor's exercise of discretion in these matters. The
Act recognizes that often the withholding of jurisdiction is just as
important to the welfare of the child as deciding to exercise jurisdic-
tion. '0s
In making the decision whether to decline jurisdiction the Act
provides three general rules. First, the court should decline jurisdic-
tion when simultaneous proceedings in other states are already
pending.' 9 Second, the chancellor should decline jurisdiction when,
under the circumstances of the case, the Arkansas court would be
an inconvenient forum."'0 And finally, the court may decline juris-
diction by reason of reprehensible conduct of one of the parties,
most particularly in the case of child-abduction."'
103. Id.
104. 251 Ark. 665, 473 S.W.2d 848 (1971).
105. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
106. The use of the term "domicile" was rejected in the Act's formula for jurisdiction
because of confusion caused by its long-term use and varied application. See Bodenheimer,
supra note 3, at 1224 (citing A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 281-82 (1962)).
107. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 3, 6.
108. In re Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 193 N.YS.2d 763 (1959).
109. U.C.C.J.A. § 6.
110. Id. § 7(c)(1)-(5).




The Act carefully outlines notice requirements that must be
met before a modification is made. Notice is to be given to all
contestants, parents whose rights have not been previously termi-
nated, and any person who has physical custody of the child."2
Provisions are made for identifying, locating, and notifying persons
outside the state of the custody proceedings,"' thereby meeting
what is believed to be the constitutional requirements for sufficient
notice in interstate child custody cases."'
Under the Act "actual notice" to the parties is not required.
Arkansas has also recognized that less than actual notice is suffi-
cient in the requested appearance of contestants in child custody
cases' 1 5 and also in the peripheral issues of child support and ali-
mony."
6
The Act goes a step further in that it also permits notice by
mail." 7 The Arkansas Supreme Court has refused to recognize mail
notice when the notice, while received, signed, and returned by the
contestant, failed properly to inform the contestant of the conse-
quences of failure to appear."' While no case appears to be directly
in point, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Arkansas court
would permit mail notice when the party has been properly in-
formed of the nature of the hearing and of the personal consequences
of not appearing. This would follow the court's prior decisions that
a parent's right to custody of a child is a personal right and that a
judgment in personam will be given extraterritorial effect only if it
appears that the person sought to be bound was previously noti-
fied.",
9
Notice provisions of the Act do not appear therefore to be in any
real conflict with Arkansas law.
(4) Bond
In many child custody disputes the enforcement of the decree
is often the sole issue. It is observed that insufficient legal sanctions
112. Id. § 6.
113. Id. §§ 4, 5.
114. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
115. Seaton v. Seaton, 221 Ark. 778, 781-82, 255 S.W.2d 954, 956 (1953). But see Pope
v. Pope, 239 Ark. 352, 389 S.W.2d 425 (1965).
116. Schley v. Dodge, 206 Ark. 1151, 178 S.W.2d 851 (1944).
117. U.C.C.J.A. § 5(a)(3).
118. Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 252 Ark. 1078, 483 S.W.2d 189 (1972).
119. Cooper v. Cooper, 229 Ark. 770, 318 S.W.2d 587 (1958) (citing May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528 (1953)).
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exist to compel the party's compliance with the court orders. 20
Under the Act bonds play an integral part in enforcing custody
decrees and ancillary orders. The Arkansas Supreme Court has also
approved the use of bonds to force parties to appear at a hearing
2'
or to compel the recognition of visitation privileges. 22
The Act requires that the court is to set bond at a figure equal
to all foreseeable reasonable expenses suffered by one party for the
failure of the other party to comply with the decree. This amount
may include travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees and
the expenses of witnesses, if such are just and proper under the
circumstances.
23
Since bonds have long been recognized in Arkansas to enforce
custody orders, no apparent conflict with Arkansas law upon pas-
sage of the Act is contemplated. Indeed, the Act would clearly au-
thorize chancery courts to set bonds at an amount sufficient to cover
all reasonable expenses of the innocent party incurred by reason of
the other party's noncompliance with the custody decree.
(5) Enforcement
The deterrent effect of the Act would decrease the number of
attempts to avoid complying with custody decrees issued by another
state. Therefore, the Act's enforcement provisions would be utilized
only in rare occasions as an alternative of last resort. Ordinarily the
enforcement device exercised is the declining of jurisdiction. 12
However, if the adjudication of the issue of jurisdiction is not
in and of itself successful in compelling compliance with the orders,
the court can impose a bond requirement or utilize contempt cita-
tions. Since the Act is silent on the use of civil and criminal con-
tempt citations for violation of custody orders, their use as a sanc-
tion is likely to be permitted. Arkansas courts have often used con-
120. Arkansas imposes criminal liability for interference with the lawful exercise of
child custody. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2411 (Repl. 1977). However, while criminal sanction may
be an effective tool against the parent or other child-abductor, legal authority does not exist
to compel the return of the child to Arkansas even though the parent is returned, tried,
convicted, and sentenced to jail. Estes v. State, 246 Ark. 1145, 442 S.W.2d 221 (1969)(decided
under the prior criminal custody statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1121 (Cum. Supp. 1973)). The
U.C.C.J.A., if passed in Arkansas, would fill this statutory void to enable the child to be
returned to Arkansas, as well as the child-abductor.
121. Herring v. Morton, 248 Ark. 718, 453 S.W.2d 400 (1970).
122. Massey v. James, 251 Ark. 217, 471 S.W.2d 770 (1971); Reid v. Reid, 218 Ark. 66,
234 S.W.2d 195 (1950). See also Coder v. Coder, 226 Ark. 478, 290 S.W.2d 628 (1956); Fulks
v. Walker, 225 Ark. 390, 283 S.W.2d 347 (1955).
123. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 7, 8, 11, 15, 19, 20.
124. Id. § 8.
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tempt citations to compel compliance with custody order provi-
sions. 2 While contempt citations are severe, their use under the Act
would be almost prima facie justified, but less frequent.
(6) Punitive Custody Decrees
Punitive custody decrees are modified custody decrees issued
by a court as a result of a violating parent's persistent defiance of
the original custody decree provisions.'26 Ordinarily the punitive
custody decree revokes all custody and visitation privileges to which
the guilty parent was originally entitled.
The Arkansas Supreme Court follows the rule adopted by the
Act which expressly rejects the use of punitive decrees. In Hamilton
v. Anderson2 7 the Arkansas court held that "the custody of the child
is not awarded for the purpose of gratifying the feelings of either
parent or with any idea of punishing or rewarding either parent.' 128
However, in the absence of punitive decrees, a real problem
does exist in selecting a method to compel either parent to comply
with the provisions of the decree. Already mentioned is the most
common device used by Arkansas chancery courts to insure parental
compliance with the custody award, that is, the posting of a bond.
The Act provides an alternative means to enforce the provisions
of the decree in the enforcement and recognition provisions of Sec-
tion 15. Under this section the decree of State A is made automati-
cally enforceable in the court of State B upon filing the decree in
State B. Through the cooperation of State B, payment of travel and
other expenses may be imposed on the violator, in addition to the
forfeiture of the bond if one had been imposed by State A. The
return of the child to State A may also be obtained by this provision.
Section 15 is very important also because it solves the inherent
problem with bonds-they are often deliberately forfeited. In many
court-ordered bond arrangements, a contestant can elect to forfeit
the bond and yet retain the possession of the child without further
liability, since the original state no longer has a sufficient interest
in the child. Under the Act, not only would the violator be forced
to return the child to the site of the custody proceedings, but the
125. See, e.g., Dennison v. Mobley, 257 Ark. 216, 515 S.W.2d 215 (1974); Songer v.
State, 236 Ark. 20, 364 S.W.2d 155 (1963); Bates v. State, 210 Ark. 652, 197 S.W.2d 45 (1946).
126. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1238-40 (citing Moniz v. Moniz, 142 Cal. App. 2d
527, 530, 298 P.2d 710, 712 (1956)).
127. 176 Ark. 76, 2 S.W.2d 673 (1928). See also Caldwell v. Caldwell, 156 Ark. 383, 246
S.W. 492 (1923).
128. Hamilton v. Anderson, 176 Ark. 76, 79, 2 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1928).
[Vol. 1
COMMENTS
violator would be responsible for the expenses caused by his mis-
deeds.
By the combined use of bonds and the cooperation of other
states, the Act's provisions would certainly serve to decrease the use
of punitive decrees and the successful attempts at self-help.
b. Deterrence of Self-Help
The deterrence of self-help measures, notably child-abduction,
is another primary goal of the Act.1"9 The Act's treatment of this
problem is a marked departure from present Arkansas law and is a
better approach.
Two recent cases exemplify the dichotomy between Arkansas
law and the proposed Act's solution to the problem. In both Johnson
v. Arledge 30 and Bonds v. Lloyd 31 one divorced parent lived in
Arkansas and the other parent resided in Texas with legal custody
of the children. In Johnson the custody decree was issued in Arkan-
sas, and in Bonds the decree was issued in Texas. In each case the
parent living in Arkansas "learned" of the alleged mistreatment of
the children in custody of the other parent in Texas. The Arkansas
parents, in both cases, went to Texas and, in violation of the court
orders granting custody to the Texas parent, unlawfully removed
the child to Arkansas. Upon returning to Arkansas, the parents in
both cases requested modification of the custody award based on
physical presence of the child in Arkansas and alleged changed
conditions.
The chancery court in Johnson found the abducting parent in
contempt for violating the court orders, but declined to punish the
violator. The chancellor then proceeded to ignore the Texas court's
home state jurisdiction in the matter and to make a new award of
custody.'32 The court in Bonds, on the other hand, expressly recog-
nized the home state jurisdiction of Texas and attempted to defer
jurisdiction to that court pending its decision whether to exercise or
decline jurisdiction. 33 The chancellor in Bonds was acting in sub-
stantial compliance with the proposed Act's provisions for modifica-
tion.
However, in each case the Arkansas parent was eventually re-
warded for his abduction of the child with a modified decree grant-
129. U.C.C.J.A. § 1(a)(5).
130. 258 Ark. 608, 527 S.W.2d 917 (1975).
131. 259 Ark. 557, 535 S.W.2d 218 (1976).
132. Johnson v. Arledge, 258 Ark. 608, 527 S.W.2d 917 (1975).
133. Bonds v. Lloyd, 259 Ark. 557, 535 S.W.2d 218 (1976).
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ing him custody. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the chancel-
lor's decision in Johnson, while reversing the chancellor in Bonds.
In fact, the chancellor in Bonds was admonished by the Arkansas
Supreme Court for "arbitrarily" refusing to accept jurisdiction and
deferring to the Texas court.'34 The conflict, therefore, between Ar-
kansas law and the Act could not be more acute than in this area.
Although the facts of each case demanded the immediate exer-
cise of official authority to ascertain and insure the welfare and best
interest of the children involved, the Arkansas Supreme Court's
approach clearly did not permit that exercise. Under the Act Texas
would have first priority under the home state rule in determining
the welfare of the children lawfully within its jurisdiction.' 35 There-
fore, the Arkansas parent, upon learning of allegations of mistreat-
ment or noncompliance with the custody orders, would first ask the
Texas court to investigate the situation; or, in a more indirect ap-
proach, request the Arkansas court to inquire of the Texas court in
behalf of the Arkansas parent. Undoubtedly the Texas officials
would immediately investigate the report and any action, if neces-
sary, would then be taken. Since both Texas and Arkansas have an
interest in the children, the Texas court, with home state jurisdic-
tion, would require that any future custody modification hearings
be held in Texas. The Texas court, on one hand, could defer juris-
diction to Arkansas to decide the custody issue. Arkansas, on the
other hand, would be expected to return the children to Texas-
protected if necessary-until the matter of custody was finally
resolved.
This approach recognizes the autonomy of each state court's
jurisdiction. Texas would have primary jurisdiction under the home
state rule and, in return, the Arkansas court would be assured that
the parents and family in Arkansas would be properly notified of
any future proceedings in Texas. The child's best interest would be
insured since the immediate issue of the child's safety would have
been addressed. The child's long term welfare would also be pro-
tected since the child would not have been subjected to a traumatic
abduction and continued litigation based perhaps only upon un-
founded rumors from a remote state.
It is apparent that if the Act's jurisdictional standards for ini-
tial and modified decrees are recognized, child-abduction should
prove useless to a parent in seeking to gain legal custody of the
134. Id. at 563, 535 S.W.2d at 221.
135. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a)(i). "Home state" jurisdiction would be applicable since the
parties had lawfully been in Texas six months prior to the proceeding at issue.
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child. '3 Not only would the abductor fail to find a court which could
legally take jurisdiction over the matter, but also the court would
send the parent and child back to the prior state court.
In sum, the Act would simplify the Arkansas rules regarding
modification of custody awards in a manner antagonistic to child-
abduction. As the situation currently stands, there are no clear rules
in this area.
E. Conclusion
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act represents a vol-
untary attempt at the state level to solve the difficult problems
encountered in enforcing child custody decrees in an interstate con-
text. The Act is a product of over thirty years of judicial applications
and observations, and its adoption in Arkansas would alleviate the
critical problems facing the resolution of interstate child custody
disputes.
While many persons critical of the Act perceive it to constitute
a direct threat to local judicial autonomy, it must be stressed that
the Act's primary focus is only on procedural aspects of state cus-
tody proceedings in interstate situations. For example, the Act ex-
cludes any direction as to the manner in which the chancellor ac-
tually arrives at the custody determination, as well as to questions
concerning child support and monetary obligations.
However, as an incident to changing the procedural mecha-
nisms, some substantive rules of law, as discussed previously, will
have to be adjusted in each state to accomodate the reciprocal effect
of the Act's provisions. It is suggested that many changes necessi-
tated by the passage of the Act will stimulate better informed and
more carefully considered custody findings. As a result, these de-
crees will be more readily enforced out of state. Indeed, the vulnera-
bility of custody decrees issued in Arkansas should be greatly
minimized, not increased, by the passage of the Act.
The Act will again be introduced in the Arkansas General As-
sembly in 1979; however, its passage is not guaranteed. A reasonable
alternative to its enactment would be for the Arkansas Supreme
Court expressly to recognize the plight of interstate children and the
basic philosophy underlying the Act. Specifically, the court could
judicially adopt the standards of the Act.
Regardless of whether by statute or judicial adoption, immedi-
136. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 1241.
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ate action needs to be taken to provide for the interstate child's best




APPENDIX: Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Actt
SECTION 1. [Purposes of Act; Construction of Provisions.]
(a) The general purposes of this Act are to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts
of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past
resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful
effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the
end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best
decide the case in the interest of the child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child
take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family
have the closest connection and where significant evidence concern-
ing his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most
readily available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise
of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connec-
tion with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in
the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure
family relationships for the child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children
undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in
this state insofar as feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other
states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state
and those of other states concerned with the same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(b) This Act shall be construed to promote the general purposes
stated in this section.
SECTION 2. [Definitions.] As used in this Act:
(1) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who
claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a child;
(2) "custody determination" means a court decision and court
orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child, includ-
ing visitation rights; it does not include a decision relating to child
support or any other monetary obligation of any person;
t Printed without Prefatory Note and Comments.
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(3) "custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which a cus-
tody determination is one of several issues, such as an action for
divorce or separation, and includes child neglect and dependency
proceedings;
(4) "decree" or "custody decree" means a custody determina-
tion contained in a judicial decree or order made in a custody pro-
ceeding, and includes the initial decree and a modification decree;
(5) "home state" means the state in which the child immedi-
ately preceeding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent,
or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecutive months, and
in the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods
of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as
part of the 6-month or other period;
(6) "initial decree" means the first custody decree concerning
a particular child;
(7) "modification decree" means a custody decree which
modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether made by the court
which rendered the prior decree or by another court;
(8) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of
a child;
(9) "person acting as parent" means a person, other than a
parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either been
awarded custody by a court or claims a right to custody; and
(10) "state" means any state, territory, or possession of the
United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District
of Columbia.
SECTION 3. [Jurisdiction.]
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child cus-
tody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination
by initial or modification decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
state within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding and
the child is absent from this State because of his removal or reten-
tion by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this
State assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or
the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection
with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial
evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships; or
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(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the
child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened
with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected [or depen-
dent]; or
(4) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction
under prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs
(1), (2), or (3), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction
on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest
of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physi-
cal presence in this State of the child, or of the child and one of the
contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court
of this State to make a child custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prere-
quisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
SECTION 4. [Notice and Opportunity to be Heard.] Before
making a decree under this Act, reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose
parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any per-
son who has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is
outside this State, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given
pursuant to section 5.
SECTION 5. [Notice to Persons Outside this State; Submission
to Jurisdiction.]
(a) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person
outside this State shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated
to give actual notice, and may be:
(1) by personal delivery outside this State in the manner pre-
scribed for service of process within the State;
(2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which
the service is made for service of process in that place in an action
in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;
(3) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served
and requesting a receipt; or
(4) as directed by the court [including publication, if other
means of notification are ineffective].
(b) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, or delivered,
[or last published] at least [10, 20] days before any hearing in this
State.
(c) Proof of service outside this State may be made by affidavit of
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the individual who made the service, or in the manner prescribed
by the law of this State, the order pursuant to which the service is
made, or the law of the place in which the service is made. If service
is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the addressee or
other evidence of delivery to the addressee.
(d) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction
of the court.
SECTION 6. [Simultaneous Proceedings in Other States.]
(a) A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under
this Act if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning
the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state
exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act,
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state be-
cause this State is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
(b) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court
shall examine the pleadings and other information supplied by the
parties under section 9 and shall consult the child custody registry
established under section 16 concerning the pendency of proceed-
ings with respect to the child in other states. If the court has reason
to believe that proceedings may be pending in another state it shall
direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or other appropri-
ate official of the other state.
(c) If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that
a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in
another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the
proceeding and communicate with the court in which the other
proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in
the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in
accordance with sections 19 through 22. If a court of this State has
made a custody decree before being informed of a pending proceed-
ing in a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court
of the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding was com-
menced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall like-
wise inform the other court to the end that the issues may be liti-
gated in the more appropriate forum.
SECTION 7. [Inconvenient Forum.]
(a) A court which has jurisdiction under this Act to make an initial
or modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any
time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient
forum to make a custody determination under the circumstances of




(b) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's
own motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or
other representative of the child.
(c) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall
consider if it is in the interest of the child that another state assume
jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into account the following
factors, among others:
(1) if another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(2) if another state has a closer connection with the child and
his family or with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(3) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more
readily available in another state;
(4) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no
less appropriate; and
(5) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would
contravene any of the purposes stated in section 1.
(d) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction
the court may communicate with a court of another state and ex-
change information pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
either court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exer-
cised by the more appropriate court and that a forum will be avail-
able to the parties.
(e) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a
court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss
the proceedings, or it may stay the proceedings upon condition that
a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another named
state or upon any other conditions which may be just and proper,
including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent
and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum.
(f) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this Act
if a custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or
another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or
other proceeding.
(g) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate
forum it may require the party who commenced the proceedings to
pay, in addition to the costs of the proceedings, in this State, neces-
sary travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred
by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made to the
clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party.
(h) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the
court shall inform the court found to be the more appropriate forum
of this fact, or if the court which would have jurisdiction in the other
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state is not certainly known, shall transmit the information to the
court administrator or other appropriate official for forwarding to
the appropriate court.
(i) Any communication received from another state informing this
State of a finding of inconvenient forum because a court of this
State is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody
registry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the
court of this State shall inform the original court of this fact.
SECTION 8. [Jurisdiction Declined by Reason of Conduct.]
(a) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the
child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible
conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if this is just
and proper under the circumstances.
(b) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state
if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody,
has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the
person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after
a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the
petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of
another state the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this
is just and proper under the circumstances.
(c) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this
section may charge the petitioner with necessary travel and other
expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by other parties or
their witnesses.
SECTION 9. [Information under Oath to be Submitted to the
Court.]
(a) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first pleading or in
an affidavit attached to that pleading shall give information under
oath as to the child's present address, the places where the child has
lived within the last 5 years, and the names and present addresses
of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. In
this pleading or affidavit every party shall further declare under
oath whether:
(1) he has participated (as a party, witness, or in any other
capacity) in any other litigation concerning the custody of the same
child in this or any other state;
(2) he has information of any custody proceeding concerning
the child pending in a court of this or any other state; and
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(3) he knows of any person not a party to the proceedings who
has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or visita-
tion rights with respect to the child.
(b) If the declaration as to any of the above items is in the affirma-
tive the declarant shall give additional information under oath as
required by the court. The court may examine the parties under
oath as to details of the information furnished and as to other mat-
ters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the
case.
(c) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any
custody proceeding concerning the child in this or any other state
of which he obtained information during this proceeding.
SECTION 10. [Additional Parties.] If the court learns from infor-
mation furnished by the parties pursuant to section 9 or from other
sources that a person not a party to the custody proceeding has
physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation
rights with respect to the child, it shall order that person to be
joined as a party and to be duly notified of the pendency of the
proceeding and of his joinder as a party. If the person joined as a
party is outside this State he shall be served with process or other-
wise notified in accordance with section 5.
SECTION 11. [Appearance of Parties and the Child.]
[(a) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in
this State to appear personally before the court. If that party has
physical custody of the child the court may order that he appear
personally with the child.]
(b) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the
court is outside this State with or without the child the court may
order that the notice given under section 5 include a statement
directing that party to appear personally with or without the child
and declaring that failure to appear may result in a decision adverse
to that party.
(c) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this State is directed
to appear under subsection (b) or desires to appear personally before
the court with or without the child, the court may require another
party to pay to the clerk of the court travel and other necessary
expenses of the party so appearing and of the child if this is just and
proper under the circumstances.
SECTION 12. [Binding Force and Res Judicata Effect of Custody
Decree.] A custody decree rendered by a court of this State which
had jurisdiction under section 3 binds all parties who have been
served in this State or notified in accordance with section 5 or who
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have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been
given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties the custody
decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as
to the custody determination made unless and until that determina-
tion is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of this
Act.
SECTION 13. [Recognition of Out-of-State Custody Decrees.]
The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or
modification decree of a court of another state which had assumed
jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance
with this Act or which was made under factual circumstances meet-
ing the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as this decree has
not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards sub-
stantially similar to those of this Act.
SECTION 14. [Modification of Custody Decree of Another
State.]
(a) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court
of this State shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to
the court of this State that the court which rendered the decree does
not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites sub-
stantially in accordance with this Act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this State has
jurisdiction.
(b) If a court of this State is authorized under subsection (a) and
section 8 to modify a custody decree of another state it shall give
due consideration to the transcript of the record and other docu-
ments of all previous proceedings submitted to it in accordance with
section 22.
SECTION 15. [Filing and Enforcement of Custody Decree of
Another State.]
(a) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be
filed in the office of the clerk of any [District Court, Family Court]
of this State. The clerk shall treat the decree in the same manner
as a custody decree of the [District Court, Family Court] of this
State. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be
enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of
this State.
(b) A person violating a custody decree of another state which
makes it necessary to enforce the decree in this State may be re-
quired to pay necessary travel and other expenses, including attor-




SECTION 16. [Registry of Out-of-State Custody Decrees and
Proceedings.] The Clerk of each [District Court, Family Court]
shall maintain a registry in which he shall enter the following:
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other states received
for filing;
(2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceed-
ings in other states;
(3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient
forum by a court of another state; and
(4) other communications or documents concerning custody
proceedings in another state which may affect the jurisdiction of a
court of this State or the disposition to be made by it in a custody
proceeding.
SECTION 17. [Certified Copies of Custody Decree.] The Clerk
of the [District Court, Family Court] of this State, at the request
of the court of another state or at the request of any person who is
affected by or has a legitimate interest in a custody decree, shall
certify and forward a copy of the decree to that court or person.
SECTION 18. [Taking Testimony in Another State.] In addition
to other procedural devices available to a party, any party to the
proceeding or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the
child may adduce testimony of witnesses, including parties and the
child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state. The court on its
own motion may direct that the testimony of a person be taken in
another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms
upon which the testimony shall be taken.
SECTION 19. [Hearings and Studies in Another State; Orders to
Appear.]
(a) A court of this State may request the appropriate court of
another state to hold a hearing to adduce evidence, to order a party
to produce or give evidence under other procedures of that state, or
to have social studies made with respect to the custody of a child
involved in proceedings pending in the court of this State; and to
forward to the court of this State certified copies of the transcript
of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise adduced, or any
social studies prepared in compliance with the request. The cost of
the services may be assessed against the parties or, if necessary,
ordered paid by the [County, State].
(b) A court of this State may request the appropriate court of
another state to order a party to custody proceedings pending in the
court of this State to appear in the proceedings, and if that party
has physical custody of the child, to appear with the child. The
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request may state that travel and other necessary expenses of the
party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be assessed
against another party or will otherwise be paid.
SECTION 20. [Assistance to Courts of Other States.]
(a) Upon request of the court of another state the courts of this
State which are competent to hear custody matters may order a
person in this State to appear at a hearing to adduce evidence or to
produce or give evidence under other procedures available in this
State [or may order social studies to be made for use in a custody
proceeding in another state]. A certified copy of the transcript of
the record of the hearing or the evidence otherwise adduced [and
any social studies prepared] shall be forwarded by the clerk of the
court to the requesting court.
(b) A person within this State may voluntarily give his testimony
or statement in this State for use in a custody proceeding outside
this State.
(c) Upon request of the court of another state a competent court
of this State may order a person in this State to appear alone or with
the child in a custody proceeding in another state. The court may
condition compliance with the request upon assurance by the other
state that travel and other necessary expenses will be advanced or
reimbursed.
SECTION 21. [Preservation of Documents for Use in Other
States.] In any custody proceeding in this State the court shall
preserve the pleadings, orders and decrees, any record that has been
made of its hearings, social studies, and other pertinent documents
until the child reaches [18, 21] years of age. Upon appropriate
request of the court of another state the court shall forward to the
other court certified copies of any or all of such documents.
SECTION 22. [Request for Court Records of Another State.]
If a custody decree has been rendered in another state concerning a
child involved in a custody proceeding pending in a court of this
State, the court of this State upon taking jurisdiction of the case
shall request of the court of the other state a certified copy of the
transcript of any court record and other documents mentioned in
section 21.
SECTION 23. [International Application.] The general policies
of this Act extend to the international area. The provisions of this
Act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees
of other states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal
institutions similar in nature to custody, rendered by appropriate
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authorities of other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to
be heard were given to all affected persons.
SECTION 24. [Priority.] Upon the request of a party to a cus-
tody proceeding which raises a question of existence or exercise of
jurisdiction under this Act the case shall be given calendar priority
and handled expeditiously.
SECTION 25. [Severability.] If any provision of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, its
invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or applica-
tion, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
SECTION 26. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.





SECTION 28. [Time of Taking Effect.] This Act shall take effect
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